A generic approach for the automatic verification of featured, parameterised systems by Miller, A. & Calder, M.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Miller, A. and Calder, M. (2005) A generic approach for the automatic 
verification of featured, parameterised systems. Proceedings of Eighth 
International Conference on Feature Interactions in Telecommunications 
and Software Systems :pp. 217-235.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/2872/ 
 
 
 
 
Glasgow ePrints Service 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
A generic approach for the automatic
verification of featured, parameterised
systems
Alice MILLER and Muffy CALDER
Department of Computing Science
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, Scotland.
muffy,alice@dcs.gla.ac.uk
Abstract. A general technique is presented that allows property based feature anal-
ysis of systems consisting of an arbitrary number of components. Each component
may have an arbitrary set of safe features. The components are defined in a guarded
command form and the technique combines model checking and abstraction. Features
must fulfill certain criteria in order to be safe, the criteria express constraints on the
variables which occur in feature guards. The main result is a generalisation theorem
which we apply to a well known example: the ubiquitous, featured telephone system.
1 Introduction
Model-checking is a popular technique for property-based feature interaction analysis of fea-
tured systems. But, there are limitations – we can only reason about systems of fixed, tractable
size. This paper addresses the limitations by introducing a technique that allows the inference
of properties of a system with arbitrary size and arbitrary features, from analysis of a system
of fixed size and features. The constraint is that the features fulfill certain criteria which we
call safe.
Property-based feature interaction analysis is based upon checking that temporal prop-
erties which characterise a given feature are preserved (or not) in the presence of another
feature(s). The usual notation for this is the following, assuming S is a system updated with
features f1 and f2: does S + f1 |= φ imply S + f1 + f2 |= φ?
We take a distributed, user oriented view of systems and therefore model a system as a
set of concurrent, communicating components, each of which may subscribe to a number
of features. We assume the paradigm of components communicating with each other (pair-
wise), either directly (e.g. telephony) or indirectly (e.g. email). Assuming p is a component
with no features, pf1 and pf1 are components with features f1 and f2 resp., and || is parallel
composition, then an example of interaction analysis in this context is:
i) does (pf1||p) |= φ imply (pf1||pf2) |= φ?
Of course a component can subscribe to more than one feature. For example, assuming
that pf1,f2 is a component with features f1 and f2, then another example of feature interaction
analysis is:
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ii) does (pf1) |= φ imply (pf1,f2) |= φ?
Now suppose that have proved i) or ii), what can we infer about the validity of φ when
there are other components in the system? For example, what can we infer about
iii) (pf1||pf2||p) |= φ, or
iv) (pf1 ||pf2||pf3||p||p) |= φ?
More generally, when p2 . . . pN and p3 . . . pN are components each of which subscribe to
arbitrary sets of features, what can we infer about
v) ∀N . (pf1 ||pf2||p3|| . . . ||pN) |= φ, or
vi) ∀N . (pf1,f2||p2|| . . . ||pN) |= φ?
v) and vi) are examples of the parameterised model checking problem, PMCP, which is
of course undecidable [2]. However, for certain subclasses of systems (with a regular topol-
ogy), a solution is possible using an invariant-based approach [17, 4, 14]. We propose such
an approach and combine model checking with abstraction to allow inference of a general
property like v) and vi) from a property of a fixed system such as the antecedents of i) and ii).
The approach relies on partitioning components into two distinct subsets: concrete com-
ponents and abstract components. The former are the components involved in the fixed sys-
tem analysis, i.e. the components in examples i) and ii). The abstract components are the
remaining components in the systems of arbitrary size/features. For example, p3, . . . , pN are
the abstract components in v). It is important to note that both concrete and abstract com-
ponents can have features, provided that the features are safe. The main contribution of this
paper is to define safe features and prove that the parameterised model checking problem is
solvable for the class of safe features. Previous work [8, 9] has only allowed abstract compo-
nents to subscribe to a small set of specific features, here we define general criteria.
2 Background
Systems are specified using a modelling language and the model – or Kripke structure [11] –
associated with this specification is checked to verify given temporal properties.
Definition 1 Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. A Kripke structure over AP is a tuple
M = (S, S0, R, L) where S ⊆ S is a finite set of states, S0 is the set of initial states,
R ⊆ S × S is a transition relation and L : S → 2AP is a function that labels each state with
the set of atomic propositions true in that state.
From here on we assume that |S0| = 1, i.e. it is a single fixed state, S0 say. We employ the
modelling language Promela and its bespoke model-checker SPIN [16] to check LTL (linear
temporal logic) properties. Simulations between Kripke structures preserve LTL properties.
Definition 2 Given two Kripke structuresM andM′ with AP ⊇ AP ′, a relation H ⊆ S×S ′
is a simulation relation between M and M′ if and only if for all s and s′, if H(s, s′) then
1. L(s) ∩AP ′ = L′(s′)
2. For every state s1 such that R(s, s1), there is a state s′1 with the property that R′(s′, s′1)
and H(s1, s′1).
If H(s0, s′0), we say thatM′ simulatesM and write MM′.
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Lemma 1 Suppose thatMM′. Then for every LTL formula φ with atomic propositions
in AP ′, M′ |= φ impliesM |= φ.
Definition 3 Let p be a component parameterised by a set of features. For a given N , let
MN be the model associated with N components, namely
MN =MN(p0||p1|| . . . ||pN−1),
or
MN =MN(C||p1||p2|| . . . ||pN−1),
where the pi denote instantiations of p and C denotes a distinguished context component.
Note that the pi are not, in general, isomorphic.
Definition 4 Given MN and 0 ≤ m ≤ N − 1, we refer to the components p0, . . ., pm−1
as concrete components, and the remaining components as abstract components. All of the
components may subscribe to different sets of features, but the features associated with the
concrete components may not involve any abstract component.
Definition 5 When a component subscribes to a feature, we refer to that component as the
feature host. When a component has the goal of communicating with another component, we
refer to the latter as the former’s partner.
2.1 Solving PMCP by abstraction
Our approach to solving PMCP, in some cases, has been introduced in [9]. We give an
overview here.
For a given system of size N with m concrete components, we derive MmN , the data
abstract model derived from MN by abstracting data values into equivalence classes. The
abstraction depends on m; essentially all values greater than m are made equivalent. Mmabs
is the (behaviour) abstract model derived from MmN . Mmabs consists of the concrete compo-
nents, and one single new component, called abs which encapsulates (is an abstraction of) the
observable behaviour of all the abstract components i.e.Mmabs =M(p0||p1|| . . . ||pm−1||abs).
The communication to/from concrete components in Mmabs may be slightly modified to take
account of substitution of abs for the abstract components. The key step is to define abs
such that there is a simulation relation between the three classes of models: MN  MmN 
Mmabs. Because simulation preserves LTL properties, we can conclude, for appropriate φ, that
M(p0||p1|| . . . ||pm−1||abs) |= φ implies ∀N . M(p0|| . . . ||pm−1||pm|| . . . ||pN−1) |= φ.
In this paper we extend the approach to include abstract components which subscribe to
safe features. The safety criteria express constraints on the variables which occur in feature
guards (e.g. local or global) and the form of feature actions (e.g. read or update). The criteria
therefore impose a taxonomy on features and we use this taxonomy to classify features as
safe or unsafe with respect to our approach to solving PMCP.
The main result is a theorem which states that if we only consider safe features, then our
technique for feature interaction detection is applicable. This result is useful because it does
not depend on the intention of a feature, nor on the application domain, it depends only the
checkable form of a feature. It is important to note that our feature classification is orthogonal
to any classification of feature interactions, our classification indicates whether or not we can
apply our general interaction detection technique.
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2.2 Guarded Command form and open symmetric features
While we specify a system in a distributed way, i.e. user components with features, we require
to assume a different form for reasoning. Namely, we assume the guarded command, GC,
form which consists of one, global loop over a choice of statements of the form guard →
command. Guards will be over-lapping when the system behaviour is non-deterministic. The
precise definition of the form depends upon the specification language; we have defined it for
Promela. We note that in some model checking tools (e.g. Murφ [13] and SMV [18]), models
are specified directly in this form. The conversion of a distributed specification into GC form
is relatively simple, it is essentially the form one obtains after applying an expansion theorem
(parallelism is converted to choice), modulo some additional “housekeeping” variables such
as local process counters. We therefore omit the details here but illustrate the form by way of
an extended Promela example in section 8.
We restrict our attention to features whose behaviour does not depend upon the behaviour
of any particular component, that is, the features are generic with respect to components.
Nearly all features in practical applications fall into this category.
Definition 6 Let MN be a model associated with N components, expressed in GC form.
Features which result in statements that conform to the following constraints are called open
symmetric. Let i be a variable over indices of the components. Then guards may not contain
propositions of the form vari == val, for a fixed value val, and for any assignment of a
component index j say to i, there must exist equivalent statements (with identical guards) in
which i can be set to any component index. Similarly for channel indices.
For example, let var1i and var2i be variables associated with a component. A state-
ment of the form (var1i == i) → var2i = 1 is only allowed if there are also statements:
(var1i == i) → var2i = 0, (var1i == i) → var2i = 2, (var1i == k) → var2i = 3, ...
(var1i == i)→ var2i = N − 1.
In the remainder of this paper we assume that all features are open symmetric.
3 Safe features
In our abstraction approach to PMCP, we define a safe feature as one which can be subscribed
to by an abstract component without affecting the validity of any property φ which is suitably
indexed (by concrete components).
Definition 7 Given a parameterised component p,MN=M(p0||p1|| . . . pm|| . . . ||pN−1) such
that 0 ≤ m ≤ N−1, and formula φ indexed by elements of {0, 1, . . . , m−1}. A set of features
F is safe iff
M(p0||p1|| . . . pm−1||abs) |= φ
implies
∀N. (p0|| . . . ||pm−1||pm|| . . . ||pN−1) |= φ
where p0, . . . , pm−1 subscribe to arbitrary features and pm, . . . , pN−1 subscribe only to fea-
tures in F .
We can easily extend this definition to systems which include a context component.
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4 Classifying features
Informally, many features can be divided into three broad categories according to whether
they are managed by the feature host, the partner of the feature host, or by a third party. Ex-
amples of these categories are Ring Back When Free (host) and Call Forward Busy (partner)
from telephony, and mail filtering (third party) from email. The main result of this paper,
given in section 7, is that these features are all safe. A feature which does not fall into one of
these categories is called multi-owned and it is not safe. An example feature in this category
is Return When Free There is a simple syntactic test for (lack) of safety, assuming a common
form for feature specifications. We will prove this result in section 7. In order to do so, we
first give some more detail on classifying features.
Guards refer to a number of propositions, each of which refers to a wide variety of vari-
ables. Variables are either local (to a component), global, or feature related. The last category
includes variables which denote whether or not a feature is subscribed to. Local variables in-
clude the local program counters (not to be confused with Promela built-in local program
counters).
Assuming guards are in conjunctive normal form, a guard that can trigger a feature has
the form
(feature prop)&&(localprop)&&(varprop)
where (feature prop) is a proposition which checks whether or not a feature is subscribed to
by a component, localprop checks properties of local variables, and varprop checks proper-
ties of global variables.
5 GC form
In this section we describe additional assumptions made about our specifications in GC form,
and describe how features are implemented in this form.
5.1 Additional assumptions
Local variables associated with each component are of three types: p-variables, the values of
which are component indices drawn from the set V = {D, 0, 1, . . . , m} (or {D, 1, . . . , m} if
there is an environment process); c-variables, the values of which are channel indices; and
standard variables (variables which are not p-variables or c-variables) of finite type. The
value D is a default value which is chosen to take the value of the smallest positive value not
equal to any component index. (In the unabstracted case this is N .)
We assume that each component has, amongst its local variables, the variable p c, denot-
ing its program counter. In addition all processes (except possibly the context process, when
one exists) have p-variables selfid denoting the component index, and partnerid denoting
its current partner. No operations on selfid are permitted; the value of partnerid is either
set by reading from a channel, or via non-deterministic choice. No other operations on the
partnerid variables, apart from resetting to D, are permitted.
The context process has index context id and may have p-variables. For example, in the
email model, the Network Mailer process has p-variables receiver and sender which take
values according to the destination and source of the current message being distributed. The
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values of these variables are set by reading messages from the Network channel, and the
only operation permissible on these variables is a reset to the default value D.
We assume that the only global variables present in our system are channels and those
pertaining to arrays indexed by elements of V . Thus all global variables are channels or have
the form glob var[i], for some i ∈ V . For any global variable glob var[i] we assume that
there exist global variables glob var[j] for all j ∈ V . We also assume no component with
index i can carry out any operation on a global variable glob var[j], for any j ∈ V , unless
glob var is a feature-flag array (see section 5.2 below) and the operation occurs within a
feature statement. We assume that all channels are finite buffers, and there is one associated
with each component.
5.2 Features in GC form
Feature statements have the form
(feature prop)&&(localprop)&&(varprop)→ command
Depending on the form of feature prop it is possible develop a feature categorisation. We
will subsequently use our categorisation together with an analysis of the form of var prop to
determine which features can be considered safe with respect to our abstraction technique.
Let us first consider feature prop. Now for any feature statement, feature prop either has
the form feature name[myvar1] == myvar2 or has the form feature name[myvar1]! = D,
where feature name is a feature array, myvar1 and myvar2 are p-variables, and either:
1. myvar1 is one of the p-variables selfid or partnerid, and myvar2 is partnerid if
myvar1 is selfid, and selfid if myvar1 is partnerid, or
2. neither myvar1 or myvar2 belong to {selfid, partnerid}.
Note that feature name[myvar1]! = D is to be read as “feature name[myvar1] does not
equal the default value D”. This is true if the component with id selfid subscribes to the
feature, regardless of the particular value of feature name[myvar1].
Many features can be divided into three broad categories according to whether they are
managed by the feature host, the partner of the feature host, or by a third party. They are there-
fore described as: host owned, partner owned or third party owned. These classes directly
correspond to whether, in all feature statements, within all feature prop guards, myvar1 is
selfid, partnerid, or some other p-variable. Examples of the first category are ODS (out-
going calls only, telephone) and encryption (email). An example of partner owned feature is
CFU (forward all calls unconditionally, telephone). In our email model, many of the features
are handled by the Network Mailer process, and so none of our email features are part-
ner owned. Examples of third party owned features include (email) filtering and forwarding
which are owned by a Client process, but managed by the Network Mailer process.
Note that the only one of our example features that can not be described in these terms
is RWF (return when free). This feature sometimes triggers a change in behaviour because
the host component has the feature (if the component has the feature and another component
has requested a ringback by setting a feature-flag array element associated with the host
component), and sometimes because the partner component has the feature (when a request
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is made by the host component for a ringback by the partner component by setting a feature-
flag array element associated with the partner element). As such, we describe RWF as multi-
owned.
Features can be further classified as to whether they are singly or doubly indexed. Singly
indexed features are those for whom all associated feature prop guards have the form
feature name[myvar1]! = D,
and doubly indexed features are those for whom all associated feature prop guards have the
form
feature name[myvar1] == myvar2.
For example OCO (outgoing calls only) is indexed by selfid only, and so is said to be
host owned, single index. (Clearly, in some contexts, features may be indexed by more than
two components. However, as none of our example features have more than two indices,
we will limit ourself to at most double index.) Accordingly we classify all of the telephone
and email features below. The remaining acronyms are TCO (terminating calls only), TCS
(terminating call screening), CFB (call forward on busy) and RBWF (ring back when free).
Full descriptions of the features may be found in [6] and [8] respectively.
host owned, single index (HS) TCO, RBWF
host owned, double index (HD) OCS, ODS
partner owned, single index (PS) CFU, CFB, OCO
partner owned, double index (PD) TCS
third party owned, single index (TS)
third party owned, double index (TD)
multi-owned, single index (MS) RWF
Table 1: Classification of features in the telephone example
host owned, single index (HS) encryption, decryption, autoresponse
host owned, double index (HD)
partner owned, single index (PS)
partner owned, double index (PD)
third party owned, single index (TS) forwarding, mailhost, remail
third party owned, double index (TD) filtering
Table 2: Classification of features in the email example
Recall that statements implementing features have the form
(feature prop)&&(localprop)&&(varprop)→ command.
As discussed earlier, feature prop is a proposition determining whether the feature is cur-
rently applicable and localprop and varprop are conjunctions of propositions concerning
local variables of a component, and global (indexed) variables respectively.
The substatements varprop may be empty, refer to global variables that are indexed only
by j say, where j 
= selfid, or contain propositions that refer to global variables indexed by
selfid. As such we refer to the type of varprop as either empty, external or internal.
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6 Constructing the abstract model Mmabs
In this section we describe changes that are made to an original model representing a finite
number of components, MN , to construct an abstracted model Mmabs. Every modification is
made with the specific aim of ensuring that every transition in MN which does not involve
any internal transitions of abstract components, is reflected in the abstract model. Recall,
we must ensure a simulation relation between Mmabs and MN . There are three important
aspects that must be considered: communication between concrete and abstract components,
the form of the abstract component abs, which represents all abstract components, and the
implementation of features. The first two of these have been discussed fully in previous work
[7, 8] and are illustrated in the extended example given in section 8. Thus we only consider
here how feature statements in concrete components must be modified.
6.1 Constructing features in the abstracted model
Let us first note that there are now m+ 1 processes (m concrete and 1 abstract process). The
Abstract process abs is assigned index m, also referred to as Absid. Note that the default
value D of all p-variables is now m+ 1. (Additional values m+2, m+ 3 etc. are sometimes
used to represent a “callback number” (telephone) or a pseudonym (email) within feature
implementations, but this detail is not relevant here.)
In this section we show how statements involving features in the unabstracted model
are replaced with a set of equivalent statements in the abstracted model. The nature of these
equivalent statements is determined by the class of feature, and the particular type of varprop,
namely empty, external or internal, see section 5.2 above. We consider the possible combina-
tions of feature class and varprop type separately. Note that we provide no examples here,
but illustrate the methods in the full, extended example given in section 8.
(a) HS/empty
These statements have the form
(feature name[selfid]! = D)&&(localprop)→ command
In this case, if no global variables indexed by partnerid (i.e. flag-array elements) are
to be updated, the entire statement remains unchanged. Otherwise, the statement is replaced
by two statements. In the first, the proposition (partnerid! = Absid) is added to subguard
and command is unchanged. In the second, the proposition (partnerid == Absid) is added
to subguard, and any update to global variables indexed by partnerid is removed from
command. The reason for this is that updates to global variables indexed by abstract compo-
nents do not result in transitions in the data abstract model. Therefore they are not necessary
in the abstract model.
(b) PS/empty
These statements have the form
(feature name[partnerid]! = D)&&(localprop)→ command
We note that we did not consider any examples of this case in our previous work since
it was assumed that no abstract component had features. Now abstract components may be
featured.
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Again we split the generic statement into two statements, depending on whether partnerid
is not equal to Absid (in which case, command is left unchanged), or otherwise. If partnerid
is equal to Absid, we must choose non-deterministically whether the feature is present in the
abstract partner. This is achieved by non-deterministically setting a local variable to on or
off in the statement preceding the feature statement. For example, if the feature is a forward-
ing feature, let the local variable be “forwarding on”. The feature is only instantiated if the
local variable is set to on. Resetting the value of the local variable to off immediately after
the feature has been instantiated prevents the statement guard from remaining true and the
identical feature being instantiated repeatedly. A non-deterministic choice is made as to the
new value of any global variables indexed by selfid updated within command. . If the feature
is a forwarding feature for example, the value of partnerid will be set to either a concrete
component id or another abstract process (i.e. fixed at Absid) via individual choices.
Note that the number of concrete components (i.e. m) determines the actual number of
statements to be added.
HD/empty, HD/external and HD/internal
Here featureprop has the form feature name[selfid] == partnerid. Because of our as-
sumption that no feature belonging to a concrete component can index an abstract compo-
nent (see section 2), feature name[selfid] == partnerid can only be true if partnerid! =
Absid. Thus we add the proposition partnerid! = Absid to the start of subguard (to avoid
our program unnecessarily trying to access an array element with index Absid).
PD/empty
These statements have the form
(feature name[partnerid] == selfid)&&(localprop)→ command
We first split the statement into two cases, when partnerid! = Absid (in which case
the statement is otherwise unchanged, as before), and when partnerid == Absid. Here we
again use a local variable to determine whether the abstract partner subscribes to this feature
or not, and statements are split as described above.
TS/empty and TD/empty
These statements have the form
(feature name[otherid1]! = D)&&(localprop)→ command
or
(feature name[otherid1] == otherid2)&&(localprop)→ command
where otherid1 and otherid2 are not selfid or partnerid.
In either case feature statements should again be split into two cases, this time according
to whether otherid1! = Absid (in which case the statement is otherwise unchanged) or
otherid1 == Absid. In the latter case, a non-deterministic choice is made as to whether the
feature is active or not, and statements are split as for the case above.
The last cases to consider are when varprop contains propositions involving the value of
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global variables indexed by i, or contains propositions involving other global variables (not
indexed by i).
Any class/external If varprop only contains propositions involving global variables which
are not indexed by selfid , then the variables either refer to channels or to global variables in-
dexed by j say, where j 
= selfid . This case is treated almost the same as the case above. Sup-
pose that a proposition refers to a channel chan, or a global variable indexed by j, glob var[j].
If chan refers to an abstract channel (i.e. is the channel associated with an abstract process),
or j == Absid, a new statement is created for every possible value of the status/contents
of chan, or value of global var[j]. If the global variable is a channel, the proposition may
simply involve a check on the status of the channel, and so only the values “full” and “not
full” need be considered.
Any class/internal
The last class of feature is that for which the varprop contains a proposition variables prop,
containing a global variable indexed by selfid , glob var[selfid ] say. We may assume that this
variable may be changed by components with ids not equal to selfid (otherwise the variable
would have been declared as a local variable) and so glob var represents a feature-flag ar-
ray. As it could have been reset by an abstract process, we can not simulate the possibility
of an abstract process resetting this variable at any time. Note that we can not simply use
non-deterministic choice to decide whether the value of glob var has been changed by the
abstract process (presumably to Absid) because to do so would assume that at some point
an existing, non-default value of glob var[selfid ] may have been overridden. This would im-
ply an earlier transition which would not have been reflected in our simulated model. Note
that we do allow non-deterministic choice over channel contents (when component with id
selfid is communicating with an abstract process), but only when communication has been
established and such overriding is not possible. (Initial communication set up from abstract
components is simulated using real messages sent to the appropriate concrete channels.) For
this reason, in order to ensure that our abstraction is sound, we do not include any feature for
which varprop is internal.
7 Theoretical results
In this section we give our main result relating feature classification and soundness of our
abstraction. First we give a lemma in which we use the notation of section 6.1.
Lemma 2 Any feature that has at least one associated feature statement in which varprop is
internal, is a multi-owned feature.
proof Let us call the feature f . A component i will only set the associated feature-flag array
(FFA say) element with index j if component j subscribes to f . Thus, for any component,
among the feature statements associated with f will be a statement for which feature prop
has the form f [partnerid ]! = D . In order for the feature to be implemented, the owner of
the feature must check the FFA element (associated with its index) to see if it has been re-
quested. Therefore, for any component i, among the feature statements associated with f will
be a statement for which feature prop has the form f [selfid ]! = D (and varprop contains the
proposition FFA[selfid ]! = D . Thus f is multi-owned.
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Lemma 2 leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 1 A set of features is safe if it does not contain any multi-owned features.
Sketch of proof A set of features F is safe if allowing abstract components to subscribe to
features in F preserves the solution of PMCP by abstraction (see definition 7). The solution
of PMCP by abstraction depends on establishing a simulation between the unabstracted and
the abstracted model. When all the features from F do not have an internal varprop, then
the simulation follows from the way we have shown, in section 6, how statements involving
features in the unabstracted model are replaced by equivalent statements in the abstracted
model. The only case where a replacement cannot be made is when varprop is internal. Thus
by Lemma 2, a multi-owned feature is not safe. For all the other feature categories, there is a
simulation and thus the features are safe.
In the next section we give an example of a system of feature-parameterised components
taken from a user-oriented, distributed view of telephony. We discuss, in some detail, how two
features are implemented in GC form and how the abstracted model is constructed, assuming
m = 2 (three concrete components). Although we omit the bulk of the specification (which
is available from our website), the discussion is necessarily quite technical. However, its
inclusion allows our previously discussed methods to be illustrated.
8 An Example from telephony
We illustrate our abstraction technique via four example Promela programs, GC form.p,
Abs GC .p, featureAbsGC .p and original .p, all of which are available on our website [5].
We do not provide the entire programs here, but use extracts from them to illustrate our
methods. In each case we consider a system of User processes,
User[0], User[1], User[2], . . . User[n− 1]
and check for interaction between features CFU [0] = 1 (User[[0] forwards all incoming calls
to User[1]) and ODS[1] = 0 (User[1] is prohibited from dialling User[0]). The associated
property is φ where φ is “if User[2] calls User[0] then a call will be attempted from User[2]
to User[1]”.
The program GC form.p is an unabstracted model representing four User processes (so
n = 3 in this case). We use a parameterised proctype definition to define the User processes,
and each is instantiated via a run statement passing the value of the process id (selfid) and the
channel name associated with that process (self ). As such our program could be described
as being in “modular GC form”. Actual GC form would be achieved by pasting four copies
of the User proctype sequentially and annotating each local variable with the process id.
However, we believe that it makes our explanations simpler to leave it in modular GC form.
Note that this example differs from similar examples provided for previous work, in that the
model is expressed in GC form. In fact, Promela models are much easier to read when not
expressed in this form (GC form prevents the use of goto statements and labels for example),
but our abstraction approach is easier to implement if they are (and easier to formalise under
the assumption that they are). The program original.p allows for the same behaviour as
GC form.p and is provided for the interested reader, as reference. Note that original.p
is annotated with comments indicating the value of p c (see below) at the corresponding
statement in GC form.p. Similarly, GC form.p is annotated with comments indicating the
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label (representing the call state, idle, diall, calling etc.) associated with the corresponding
statement in original.p.
In GC form.p, propositions that are to be used within guards in statements implementing
the CFU and ODS features are defined as:
#define feature_property1
((partnerid!=callback_number)&&(state==st_diall)&&
(CFU[partnerid]!=default1))
and
#define feature_property2
((state==st_diall)&&(ODS[selfid]==partnerid))
respectively.
Feature statements associated with these guards are:
::atomic{((position_prop)&&(feature_property1))->
partnerid=CFU[partnerid];
partner[selfid]=chan_name[partnerid]}
and
::atomic{((position_prop)&&(feature_property2))->
state=st_unobt}
respectively. Note chan name is an array whose ith entry contains the channel name asso-
ciated with User[i] and position prop is a disjunction of atomic statements concerning the
value of p c, a local variable labelling the position of the User process within the proctype
definition. The value of position prop is true at specific points in the code at which fea-
tures may be triggered. If position prop is true but none of the guards within the feature
statements are true, the value of p c is increased and the User process progresses to its next
statement. (Note that feature propositions and statements are provided for a suite of other
features, but are commented out as they are not relevant for this verification.) In the notation
used throughout the paper, feature statements have the form
(feature prop)&&(localprop)&&(varprop)→ command
In our CFU statement, (feature prop) is (CFU [partnerid]! = default1)), localprop is
((partnerid! = callback number)&&(state == st diall)&&(position prop)), and varprop
is empty.
For example, consider the following fragment taken from GC form.p, associated with
states in which the User process is in the diall state, and selecting a partner to call:
::/*diall*/atomic{(p_c==4)->
partner[selfid]=zero;partnerid=0;state=st_diall;
dialled[selfid]=0;state=st_diall;p_c++}
::/*diall*/atomic{(p_c==4)->
partner[selfid]=one;partnerid=1;state=st_diall;
dialled[selfid]=1;p_c++}
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::/*diall*/atomic{(p_c==4)->
partner[selfid]=two;partnerid=2;state=st_diall;
dialled[selfid]=2;p_c++}
::/*diall*/atomic{(p_c==4)->
partner[selfid]=three;partnerid=3;state=st_diall;
dialled[selfid]=3;p_c++}
::/*diall*/atomic{(p_c==4)->partnerid=callback_number;
state=st_diall;p_c++}
::/*diall*/atomic{(p_c==4)->
dev[selfid]=on;self?messchan,messbit;
messchan=null;messbit=0;
MYSTATE[selfid]=preidle; p_c=24}
::/*diall*/atomic{((p_c==6)&&(state==st_unobt))->
state=on;partner[selfid]=null;partnerid=default1;
dialled[selfid]=default1;
MYSTATE[selfid]=unobtainable;p_c=16}
Note that the actual code provided on our website involves more choices. This is for state-
space minimisation reasons, we only want to change the value of the dialled and MY STATE
variables for process 2, as these variables are only used for verification purposes and do not
affect behaviour. This does not contravene open symmetry.
When the value of p c is 4 either a partner is selected, or the handset is replaced and
the call attempt abandoned. In the first case, p c is incremented. The atomic proposition
(p c == 5) is a disjunct of position prop, and so the feature statements are checked to see
whether any of the features should be triggered at this point. All relevant features (if any) are
then implemented until none of the feature guards are true. At this point p c incremented, so
that the relevant statement (not feature-related) when p c == 6 can be executed.
In Abs GC .p we give a model representing 3 concrete processes and an abstract process
Abstract. In this case, none of the abstract processes are assumed to have any features. As
such, Abs GC .p is derived from GC form.p in two ways:
1. The feature propositions are modified to include the proposition (partnerid! = Absid),
where partnerid is a variable containing the value of the id of current partner, and Absid
is the id of the Abstract process. For example, the feature proposition associated with the
call forwarding feature described above, is modified to
#define feature_property1
((partnerid!=callback_number)&&(partnerid!=Absid)&&
(state==st_diall)&&(CFU[partnerid]!=default1))
This is because we have assumed that no feature at a concrete component involves an
abstract component.
2. Any statement in the User proctype that involves communication must be modified. If the
current partner is the abstract process then a write to the partner’s channel is replaced by
a skip (or empty action, no communication actually takes place). For example, consider
the following fragment of code taken from GC form.p associated with the calling state.
::/*calling*/atomic{((p_c==9)&&(state==st_call2)&&
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(!(partner[selfid] == self))&&(len(partner[selfid])==0))->
state=on;partner[selfid]!self,0;self?messchan,messbit;
self!partner[selfid],0;messchan=null;messbit=0;
MYSTATE[selfid]=oalert;p_c=17}
This is replaced by the following statements in Abs GC .p (note that out channel is the
name of the channel associated with the abstract component).
::/*calling*/atomic{((p_c==9)&&(partner!=out_channel)
&&(state==st_call2)&&(!(partner[selfid] == self))
&&(len(partner[selfid])==0))->
state=on;partner[selfid]!self,0;self?messchan,messbit;
self!partner[selfid],0;messchan=null;messbit=0;
MYSTATE[selfid]=oalert;p_c=17}
::/*calling*//*abstract choice*/ atomic{((p_c==9)
&&(partner==out_channel)&&
(state==st_call2))->
state=on;
self?messchan,messbit;
self!partner[selfid],0;messchan=null;messbit=0;
MYSTATE[selfid]=oalert;p_c=17}
When the partner is abstract, a read from the partner’s channel (out channel) is replaced
by a non-deterministic choice over the possible contents (if any) of the partner’s channel.
For example, consider the following two statement in GC form.p associated with the
talert state. The first statement indicates the action to be taken when the partner’s channel
contains the name of the User’s own channel (self), and the second when it does not.
::/*talert*/atomic{((p_c==21)&&(len(partner[selfid])==1)&&
(partner[selfid]?[self,messbit]))->
messchan=null;messbit=0;
MYSTATE[selfid]=tpickup;p_c=22}
::/*talert*/atomic{((p_c==21)&&(len(partner[selfid])==1)&&
(!(partner[selfid]?[self,messbit])))->
self?messchan,messbit;
partner[selfid]=null;partnerid=default1;
messchan=null;messbit=0;
MYSTATE[selfid]=preidle;p_c=24}
These are replaced by the following statements in Abs GC.p
::/*talert*/atomic{((p_c==21)&&(partner!=out_channel)&&
(len(partner[selfid])==1)&&
(partner[selfid]?[self,messbit]))->
messchan=null;messbit=0;
MYSTATE[selfid]=tpickup;p_c=22}
::/*talert*/atomic{((p_c==21)&&(partner!=out_channel)&&
(len(partner[selfid])==1)&&
(!(partner[selfid]?[self,messbit])))->
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self?messchan,messbit;
partner[selfid]=null;partnerid=default1;
messchan=null;messbit=0;
MYSTATE[selfid]=preidle;p_c=24}
::/*talert*//*abstract choice*/
atomic{((p_c==21)&&(partner==out_channel))->
messchan=null;messbit=0;
MYSTATE[selfid]=tpickup;p_c=22}
::/*talert*//*abstract choice*/
atomic{((p_c==21)&&(partner==out_channel))->
self?messchan,messbit;
partner[selfid]=null;partnerid=default1;
messchan=null;messbit=0;
MYSTATE[selfid]=preidle;p_c=24}
Similarly, any poll of the User’s own channel (or a read, followed by an action determined
by the contents of the channel) which occurs after a connection has been established, is
replaced by non-deterministic choice.
Finally, featureAbsGC .p contains an abstract model in which abstract features are as-
sumed to contain any of our suite of features, apart from RWF (return when free). The state-
ments (from Abs GC.p) that must be modified are feature propositions, feature statements,
and statements which precede feature statements (i.e. statements which contain an atomic
proposition (p c == r) where (p c == r + 1) is a conjunct of proposition position prop,
described above).
Let us consider each feature separately. Note that any feature proposition that relates to
any feature not present in our concrete components will be commented out in our model.
However, for features that are partner owned (see section 5.2), these statements must be re-
placed by propositions which implement the feature when the partner is abstract and the
feature applicable. For example consider the forwarding features CFU and CFB (call for-
warding on busy). In featureAbsGC.p the feature proposition associated with both of these
features is
/*CFU or CFB*/
#define feature_property17 ((partnerid==Absid)
&&(state==st_diall)&&(forwarding_feature==on))
where forwarding feature is a local variable which, if the current partner is abstract, is non-
deterministically set to on or off in the preceding statement. The corresponding feature state-
ments are:
/*forward to a new concrete partner*/
::atomic{((position_prop)&&(feature_property17))->
partnerid=0;partner[selfid]=zero;forwarding_feature=off}
::atomic{((position_prop)&&(feature_property17))->
partnerid=1;partner[selfid]=one;forwarding_feature=off}
::atomic{((position_prop)&&(feature_property17))->
partnerid=2;partner[selfid]=two;forwarding_feature=off}
/*or forward to another abstract process*/
/*or do not forward because partner is not busy (CFB)*/
::atomic{((position_prop)&&(feature_property17))->
forwarding_feature=off}
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Note that a non-deterministic choice is made as to whether the call is forwarded to one of
the concrete components, to another abstract component, or not forwarded at all. Partner-
owned, screening features (TCS, terminating call screening, and OCO, outgoing calls only)
are dealt with in a similar way. Modifications to all other features, which are not relevant to
this example, may be seen (commented out) in the full program featureAbsGC.p, on our
website.
All of the programs can be verified using SPIN. For the interested reader we provide
verification statistics for each run in table 3 below. In each case we give the number of stored
states (×106), the memory used for state storage (in Mb), the maximum search depth reached
(×105), and the time taken for verification (user + system, in seconds). All verifications were
performed on a PC with a 2.4GHz Intel Xenon processor, 3Gb of available main memory,
running Linux (2.4.18). State compression was used throughout.
model states Memory Depth Time
original.p 1.6 53.4 7.5 50
GC form.p 15.9 562 57 980
AbsGC.p 1 423 16.5 608
featureAbsGC .p 22 788.3 30 1628
Table 3: Verification results
9 Related Work
Our induction approach involves constructing a process Mmabs, which encapsulates the be-
haviour of any number of processes. As such, our approach is similar to other induction
approaches which involve the construction of an invariant process. Kurshan et al [17] prove
a structural induction theorem for processes using the simulation pre-order (see section 2) to
generate an invariant when there is no context process. Similar results are achieved [4, 22]
by establishing a bisimulation equivalence between global state graphs of systems of differ-
ent sizes. Extensions to these early results, when a (non-trivial) context process is involved,
include [15, 3, 17, 1]. In some cases [20, 12] network grammars are used to generate both
suitable families and an invariant.
In [7] we introduced our generalisation technique for feature interaction analysis of a
telephone system with any number of components. In [8, 9] we applied a similar approach to
an email system, allowing limited sets of features in abstract components. In [10] we began to
investigate a more systematic way to relax the constraint on features in abstract components
and to formalise our approach. We introduced the GC (guarded command) form as a uniform
way of expressing basic components and features.
10 Conclusions and future work
The key, novel contribution of this paper is a technique for proving general results about
systems of featured components. The technique extends our previous work so that we can
allow arbitrary sets of safe features in the abstract components. We define criteria on the
features to ensure that they are safe. These criteria express constraints on the variables which
occur in feature guards and the form of feature action; they impose a taxonomy on features.
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The main result is a theorem which states that if a feature is safe, then our generalisation
technique for feature interaction detection is applicable. This result is useful because it does
not depend on the intention of a feature, nor on the application domain, but only the checkable
form of a feature.
The classification depends on whether a feature is host, partner, third party or multi-
owned, and single or double indexed. We applied the classification to two well known featured
systems, POTS and email. We found that all the features considered are safe, except RWF.
This is because it triggers behaviour when it is both host owned and partner owned.
Future work will involve applying the results to 3-way calls and other featured systems;
we also intend to investigate how the GC form relates to other feature presentations such as
Ryan et al’s feature construct [19].
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